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ABSTRACT: The paper discusses Marcus’s formulation of the principle of substitutivity. She relied on a notion of log-
ical form in which certain problematic kinds of context are analyzed away. I defend a variant formulation 
of the principle in which the problematic contexts are accommodated in their own right. 
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RESUMEN: El artículo discute la formulación de Marcus del principio de sustituibilidad. Se apoyó en una noción de 
forma lógica en la que el análisis elimina algunos tipos problemáticos de contexto. Defiendo una formula-
ción variante del principio en la cual los contextos problemáticos se acomodan por derecho propio. 
Palabras clave: opacidad; anáfora; indexicalidad; explicación. 
1. Introduction 
A major thread that runs through the work of Ruth Barcan Marcus1 is her debate with 
Quine over the question of the intelligibility of de re modal language (see Marcus 1990a 
for a summation). In (Quine 1955), the main symptom of the unintelligibility of de re 
modal language is said to be the failure of coreferential singular terms to interchange 
salva veritate within the scope of modal operators. From this it is supposed to follow 
that the notion of objectual satisfaction is inapplicable to de re formulae, hence quanti-
fying-in makes no sense. A response that was once favored by Marcus is to reconstrue 
the semantics of quantification substitutionally, as in (Marcus 1961). But as she had al-
ready pointed out (Marcus 1948), Smullyan (1948) had demonstrated that Quine’s 
premise, that the rule of Identity Elimination (=E) fails in modal languages, is incor-
rect. Quine’s later ‘animadversions’ about de re modality (e.g., in Quine 1966), accuse it 
of commitment to an invidious Aristotelian essentialism, but work by Marcus and Par-
sons (Marcus 1967; Parsons 1969) shows that this charge has little force. 
 And there matters rest so far as de re modality is concerned. But of course, this is 
not the whole story. For the argument that where =E fails, quantifying-in makes no 
sense, is still of relevance to other cases in which =E does seem to fail. First, a Quinean 
paradigm of failure of substitutivity (Quine 1961, 22)  
(1) Giorgione is so-called because of his size; Giorgione is Barbarelli; therefore, 
Barbarelli is so-called because of his size. 
                                                      
* An earlier version of this paper was given at an APA session on the philosophy of Ruth Marcus in 2000. 
I thank Marcus and members of the audience for their comments on that occasion. I also thank a re-
feree for THEORIA for criticisms which improved my penultimate draft. 
1 All page references to Marcus’s writings in this paper are to (Marcus 1993). 
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Here, a use of =E leads us astray. In addition, quantifying-in produces something unin-
terpretable; that is, no complete proposition can be assigned to the quantified sentence 
(even though it is obtained by Existential Introduction (∃I) from a complete proposi-
tion): 
(2) Someone is such that he is so-called because of his size. 
He cannot be a pronoun bound by the initial someone and also an indexical or a name. 
More carefully, a standard understanding of the English excludes this (we could devise 
some conventions that would make (2) artificially interpretable, as we could for any 
nonsense string). But he would have to be a name to be a suitable antecedent for so-
called. (2) is true if interpreted substitutionally, but it is a bug, not a feature, of the sub-
stitutional interpretation of someone is such that… that it assigns a truth-value to (2). 
 In another example (Fine 1989, 222-3; see also Linsky 1967, 104), 
(3) The man behind Fred saw him leave; the man behind Fred = the man in front 
of Bill; therefore, the man in front of Bill saw him leave 
we again find failure of =E, and, relatedly, uninterpretability as the outcome of quanti-
fying-in: 
(4) Someone is such that he saw him leave. 
Syntax excludes interpreting him as coindexed with he and someone, which means that, 
barring a surreptitious conversion of its semantics from anaphoric to deictic, him can 
only be a variable that is free in (4). 
 However, there is at least one case where it looks as if we have failure of =E com-
bined with the acceptability of quantifying-in, the case of attitude ascriptions. For alt-
hough 
(5) Lex fears Superman; Superman = Clark; therefore Lex fears Clark 
seems wrong, we would not object to 
(6) Lex fears Superman; therefore, someone is such that Lex fears him 
on the grounds that the conclusion is intuitively uninterpretable. 
 One response to these data is to accept that the illustrated uses of =E are all as in-
correct as they appear, while of the three uses of ∃I displayed in (2), (4) and (6), the 
one in (6) involves a special maneuver that explains its validity. I will develop this re-
sponse in the rest of the paper against the backdrop of an attempt by Marcus to for-
mulate =E with the right restrictions to block incorrect uses. 
2. Marcus and Cartwright on =E 
As discussed in (Marcus 1975), Cartwright (1971) accepts that (1) is a counterexample 
to =E, but distinguishes this rule of inference from Leibniz’s Law, which may be for-
mulated as if a = b then every property of a is a property of b or as if a = b then whatever is true of 
a is true of b. Cartwright holds that the Law is not threatened by (1), because the ex-
pression (presumably expression-type) is so-called because of his size does not express a 
property, or a condition that can be true or false of things. Marcus is sceptical that the 
fate of the inference-rule can come apart from that of the Law so easily (1975, 103), 
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but it seems to me that we can make a stronger objection, namely, that the Law does 
no better with (1) than does the inference rule. For it is perfectly fine to attribute to 
Giorgione the property of being so-called because of his size (that token of the predi-
cate is not defective qua expressing a property); equally, it is unproblematically true of 
Giorgione that he is so-called because of his size.2 Moreover, Giorgione is Barbarelli. 
Yet Barbarelli does not have the property of being so-called because of his size; equal-
ly, it is not true of Barbarelli that he is so-called because of his size. 
 Marcus’s own proposal is that the rule of inference is only applicable to logical 
forms, in which various kinds of ambiguity to which ordinary discourse is subject have 
been eliminated (1975, 105). She points out that  
(7) Giorgione is so-called because of his size 
could mean that Giorgione is called ‘Shorty’ because of his size if it immediately fol-
lows an utterance of Shorty is so-called because of his size (I will incorporate this point in 
§3). She then proposes the following formulation of =E, improving on Cartwright’s 
version (op. cit., 108): 
(8) For all proper names a and b (indexed to preserve univocality), a = b express-
es a true proposition just in case, for all sentences P, S and S*, if S is a re-
statement of P in logical form and if S* is like S save for containing an occur-
rence of b where S contains an occurrence of a, then S expresses a true prop-
osition only if S* does. 
However, while the requirement that the rule be applied only to logical forms can deal 
with problem cases in which substitution affects syntactic structure, (8) does not seem 
to me to make much headway with (1) and (3).3 The minor premise of (3) may be 
written 
(9) The man behind Fred1 saw him1 leave 
using indices to mark anaphoric relations. If we wish to replace the man behind Fred 
with the coreferential the man in front of Bill, we either have to use the same index on 
Bill or a different one. If we use the same one, we get a falsehood if the man in the 
middle did not see Bill leave; if we use another index i, we get something uninterpret-
able (‘him1’ would be a free variable); and if we use no index, him becomes deictic. (8) 
fails to help us here. 
 Does (8) do better with (7)? Though Marcus is not explicit, her point about the 
context-sensitivity of so and the context-insensitivity of logical forms indicates that at 
logical form, she would eliminate so-called in favor of called NN, where NN is the ex-
pression the context provides by which the relevant entity is called. This allows free 
use of =E; for example, we can substitute the sole occurrence of Giorgione used as a 
name of big Giorgio in Giorgione is called Giorgione because of his size (Barbarelli is called 
that for the same reason), and the worry about Shorty no longer arises.  
                                                      
2 I intend this judgement to be intuitively plausible, but the theory developed in this paper offers further 
support. ‘So’ is treated as a demonstrative, and there doesn’t seem to be any reason why a demonstra-
tive in a complex predicate should render tokens defective qua property-expression. 
3 For structure-affecting substitutions, see (Fine 1989, III). I assume substitution replaces all and only the 
contents of some node in the minor premise’s parse tree. 
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 But this proposal about the logical form of (7) seems unacceptable to me, as does 
its analogue for (9), which requires him1 to be replaced at logical form by Fred. It be-
longs to the semantics of an anaphoric pronoun that its semantic value is recovered in 
the course of interpretation from an autonomously referring expression that anchors 
it, a process that simply disappears under the replacement proposal. The semantics of 
so also disappears. So is a demonstrative: (7) means Giorgione is called by that  name because 
of his size. We should therefore expect a formal semantics for a language with the sub-
stitution-blocking so device to use apparatus of a kind standardly deployed in the se-
mantics of demonstratives, e.g., the LD framework of (Kaplan 1989b).4 
 Despite these objections to Marcus’s proposed version of =E, I agree that the rule 
is correct if formulated in a way that is appropriate for the expressive resources of the 
language in question. Our two examples of misapplication of =E indicate that what 
we need is a restriction to the effect that a substitution may be made in S(a) using the 
major premise a = b so long as the substitution has no truth-condition-altering side-effects. 
The side-effects in our fallacious substitutions are, in (1), that the referent of so is al-
tered, and in (3), that the antecedent of him is changed, so these truth-condition-
altering substitutions are to be forbidden. It is this semantic criterion, of not altering 
truth-condition, that blocks fallacious uses of =E. But semantic criteria are in princi-
ple unavoidable, since in natural language, the ways of affecting truth-condition as a 
result of a substitution are open-ended. A purely syntactic criterion is only available 
for a formal language, in which ways of making a truth-condition-altering substitution 
are precisely circumscribed. I turn now to some examples. 
3. Demonstrating words 
In sketching a treatment of so-called,5 I will work round the problematic because of by 
supposing we are concerned with a formal language LF containing a three-place predi-
cate F(x, t, z), to be read x is called t for z, as in Giorgione is called Giorgione for his size and 
Giorgione is called so for his size (I assume so-called is derived from called so, and take pos-
sessive descriptions such as his size to be singular terms).6 I propose to ignore any ex-
tensionality problems this may give rise to. t is either so, or for some syntactically sim-
                                                      
4 Montalbetti (2003, 133) points to pronoun-like behavior in so which threatens my classification of it as a 
demonstrative. For example, in April is so-called for when she was born, and June is too, the sloppy reading, 
on which the second conjunct means June is called June for when she was born, dominates. But in April is 
called that for when she was born, and June is too, the strict reading (June is called April for when she was born) 
dominates the sloppy one, if the latter even exists. Here so contrasts with that as his does: the sloppy 
reading of John loves his wife and Bill does too is more favored, absent priming, while John loves that woman 
and Bill does too doesn’t have a sloppy reading. But this contrast between so and that is consistent with 
so being a demonstrative. When the elided called that for when she was born is restored for interpretation, 
the context of evaluation doesn’t change, and the newly explicit that defaults to the demonstrandum the 
context already provides (if it is indexed, as in Kaplan’s system, the index will just be copied). But 
when the elided so-called for when she was born is restored the context changes, since the context is the 
linguistic environment of so. The second so therefore has the option of referring to June, and ceteris pa-
ribus prefers the more salient (because closer) name. 
5 Ch. 8.2 of (Forbes 2006) is a compressed version of some of the material in this section. 
6 In a more realistic account, the third argument of F would be a proposition or state of affairs. 
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ple constant c among the constants of LF, t is a quotation name c of c. LF is otherwise a 
standard first-order language, except that the interpretation of F, VA(F), is constrained 
by the principle that <x, c, z> is in VA(F) only if VA(c) = x (Giorgione can be called 
Giorgione for some reason only if Giorgione refers to Giorgione).  
 An LF-discourse is a sentence or set of sentences of LF in which occurrences of so 
are distinctively numbered, and for each individual constant c, occurrences of c are dis-
tinctively numbered. 
 A context µ is a function from a set of positive integers (perhaps empty) to a set of 
pairs each of the form <j, c>, where j is a positive integer and c is an individual con-
stant of LF. µ(i) = <j, c> means that the occurrence of so numbered i in the sentence 
or discourse being evaluated refers to the occurrence of the name c numbered j.         
If µ(i) = <j, c> we define µ1(i) = j and µ2(i) = c. Technically, we also require stipula-
tions ensuring that each context is suitable for any structure with which it is paired in 
the evaluation of a discourse that has occurrences of so (this means a so always refers 
to a name in the structure’s domain), and that such a context is defined for the discourse 
being evaluated (each occurrence of a so refers to some name actually in the dis-
course). 
 A context µ for an LF-discourse may be displayed using arrows that link occur-
rences of so to the expressions they demonstrate in the discourse. For example, for the 
conditional 
(10.1) If Caravaggio was called so for his birthplace and Guercino was called so for 
his squint, then Guercino was called so for his squint and Caravaggio was 
called so for his birthplace 
or in LF, 
(10.2) F(C(1), so(1), hisC  birthplace) & F(G(1), so(2), hisG  squint) → 
       F(G(2), so(3), hisG  squint) & F(C(2), so(4), hisC  birthplace) 
there are various contexts available. The most likely is the context µ* defined by  
(11) µ*(1) = <1, C>; µ*(2) = <1, G>; µ*(3) = <2, G>; µ*(4) = <2, C>. 
and displayed, for (10.2), as follows: 
(12.1) F(C, so, hisC birthplace) & F(G, so, hisG squint) → 
  
         F(G, so, hisG squint) & F(C, so, hisC birthplace). 
 
With contexts displayed explicitly, there is no need to write in superscripts on the oc-
currences of so or the individual constants.  
 The semantics of LF is given by a standard recursive definition of the concept 
(A, µ) ⊨h f, read as “φ is true in the structure A and context µ relative to the assign-
ment h”. Here φ is an LF -wff, and h is a partial function into DA defined for all the 
variables free in φ; A is suitable for µ; and µ is defined for Δ = {φ}. If φ is a formula 
in which a specific context is displayed, as in (12.1), we may speak of its truth-value 
(relative to h) in A simpliciter. 
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 The clauses of the semantics are as would be expected, µ being appealed to only to 
give the reference of an occurrence of so. Following Kaplan (1989b, 544-6), we define 
a general notion of content in a structure A and context µ relative to an assignment h, 
which appeals to DA for individual constants, to h for free variables, and to µ for so (I 
postpone the details of the treatment of descriptions): 
(13.1) ⟦c(k)⟧A,µ,h = VA(c), c a syntactically simple constant with optional superscript; ⟦c⟧A,µ,h = VA(c) = c; 
(13.2) ⟦so(i)⟧A,µ,h = µ2(i); 
(13.3) ⟦v⟧A,µ,h = h(v), v an individual variable for which h is defined. 
The clauses for atomic and complex formulae based on (13.1)–(13.3) are completely 
standard. For instance, for atomic formula, negations and quantifiers, we have 
(14.1) if φ(t1,…,tn) is an atomic wff of LF, where each ti is either a variable or a  
constant or an occurrence of so, then (A, µ) ⊨h φ(t1,…,tn) iff: 
<⟦t1⟧A,µ,h,…,!⟦t1⟧A,µ,h> is in VA(φ); 
(14.2) (A, µ) ⊨h ~φ iff (A, µ) ⊭h φ; 
(14.3) (A, µ) ⊨h (some/every v: ψv)[φv] iff for some/every x in D such that   
 (A, µ) ⊨h^(v ⇒ x) ψv, we also have (A, µ) ⊨h^(v ⇒ x) φv.7 
 This leaves us to define validity and consequence. Sentences (10.1) and (10.2) have 
the appearance of logical truths, since, ignoring superscripts, they seem to be instances 
of (p & q) → (q & p). But with the demonstranda of their occurrences of so unspecified, 
they are like ϕ(that) → ϕ(that) in Kaplan’s system, logically true only if the homony-
mous demonstratives are coreferential (Kaplan 1989a, 587). However, with the con-
text µ* defined in (11) provided to fix the reference of the so’s, it is clear that changes 
in the interpretation of the remaining non-logical vocabulary will not affect truth-
value; that is, sentence-type (10.2) expresses a logically true proposition in the context 
µ* (there are other contexts in which it does not even express a truth). So one notion 
of validity is that of a sentence which is valid in a context: if µ is defined for {σ} and A 
is suitable for µ, (A, µ) ⊨ σ. But for so-free sentences, which are not context-sensitive, 
we have the standard concept of universal validity. A so-free sentence is universally valid 
iff it is a logical truth of conventional first-order logic. 
 We can define semantic consequence in the predictable way: 
(15)  Σ ⊨µ σ iff µ is defined for Δ = Σ ∪ {σ} and for every A suitable for µ, if 
(A, µ) ⊨ τ for every τ in Σ, then (A, µ) ⊨ σ. 
To assess (1) in these terms, we treat its premises and conclusion as a single discourse 
for which µ is defined, with so having two occurrences. Displaying the context µ† de-
fined by µ†(1) = <1,G>, µ†(2) = <2, B>, we will then have 
                                                      
7 Closed sentences are evaluated with respect to the null variable-assignment; when a determiner binding 
a variable is encountered, the current assignment h is extended by assigning an object a to the variable 
v, resulting in h^(v ⇒ a) (the syntax excludes double-binding).  
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(16) F(G, so, his size), G = B  ⊭ F(B, so, his size) 
 
(without the arrows, replace ⊭ with ⊭µ†). A context-relative valid argument is ob-
tained by replacing µ† with µ* defined as µ*(1) = <1, G>, µ*(2) = <1, G> (the second 
so also refers to the initial Giorgione). 
 It is clear that the failure of quantifier introduction on G in the minor premise of 
(16) has nothing to do with G or its position being “not purely referential”. The se-
mantics of individual constants in the framework we have just set out is entirely 
standard. Nor is the problem just that V(so) is stipulated to be a subset of D × DLF × 
D, since this is consistent with 
(17) (some x: person(x))[ F(x, so, his size)] 
 
being logically false. (17) should rather come out uninterpretable. One way of achiev-
ing this would be to write the syntax of LF so that F(x, so, his size) is not well-formed; 
but it is perfectly well-formed—trouble only arises when a so tries to link to the x. The 
best option seems to be to modify (13.2), which defines the content of so(i) in a context 
µ and structure A. Instead of setting ⟦so(i)⟧A,µ,h equal to µ2(i), we make the assignment 
of a content conditional: 
(18) ⟦so(i)⟧A,µ,h = µ2(i) if µ2(i) is an individual constant of LF; ⟦so(i)⟧A,µ,h is undefined 
otherwise. 
We redefine a context to be a function µ whose range is a set of pairs <j, α>, where j 
is a positive integer and α is any well-formed expression of LF. Then in conjunction with 
(18), leaving everything else as it is, the derivation of a truth-condition for (17) “crash-
es” when it tries to call the value of so and finds it undefined. 
 Explaining why (17) cannot be inferred from the minor premise of (16) is part of 
the more general project of providing an adequate system of inference for which we 
will have such results as: 
(19.1) F (G, so, his size), G = B ⊬ F(B, so, his size) 
 
(19.2) F(G, so, his size), G = B ⊢ F(B, so, his size) 
 
(19.3) F(G, so, his size) ⊬ (∃y) F(x, so, his size). 
 
(19.4) F(G, so, his size) ⊢ (∃x) F(x, so, his size). 
 
The most natural notion of proof for this consequence relation is one in which a 
proof is a list of sequents of the form Γ ⊢ σ, in which σ and every member of Γ is a 
sentence-in-context, as illustrated in (19.1)–(19.4). Intro and Elim rules apply to       
the sentence-in-context on the right of ⊢, with appropriate adjustments to the          
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premise-assumption set on the left. The Elimination rule for so is that from                
Γ ⊢ …F(t1, so(i), t2)… we may infer Γ ⊢ …F(t1, c, t2)…, where c is the constant µ2(i) 
(i.e., the one the i’th occurrence of so refers to in the context in which the inference is 
being carried out). The Introduction rule is that from Γ ⊢ …F(t1, c, t2)…, we may infer 
Γ ⊢ …F(t1, so(i), t2)…, where the context µ is extended to a new context µ. defined for 
i, and µ.(i) is some occurrence of c on the current line (in terms of constructing a 
proof, this involves drawing a new arrow).8  
 =E and quantifier introduction rules are the only primitive rules that replace indi-
vidual constants. Assuming that such replacement is the only way that quantifier intro-
duction works, then we must require that a name can be substituted in =E or replaced 
by a variable in a use of a QI rule only if it is not targeted by an arrow. Thus the con-
nection between substitution-resistance and the uninterpret- ability of quantifying-in is 
quite simple in this case: the condition that prevents substitution is the very same one 
that blocks quantifier introduction. 
 To end this part of our discussion, here is a proof of (19.2):  
(20.1) F(G, so, his size) ⊢ F(G, so, his size)            Premise 
 
(20.2) G = B ⊢ G = B                  Premise 
(20.3) F(G, so, his size) ⊢ F(G, ‘G’, his size)           1 so-E 
 
(20.4) F(G, so, his size), G = B ⊢ F(B, ‘G’, his size)            2,3 =E 
 
(20.5) F(G, so, his size), G = B ⊢ F(B, so, his size)          4 so-I 
 
As this proof illustrates, the rules for so are context-manipulation rules, so that context 
can change from line to line in a proof. So the appropriate notion of soundness for 
these rules is not that of preserving validity relative to a fixed context, but rather, rela-
tive to a variable one. More precisely, where µ is defined for Σ ∪ {σ} and µ. is defined 
for Σ. ∪ {σ.}, we require of each rule R that if Σ. ⊢µ. σ. may be inferred from Σ ⊢µ σ 
using R, then if Σ ⊨µ σ, then Σ. ⊨µ. σ.. The rules for connectives are all sound, since in 
their use, µ = µ.. And the soundness of the so-rules is easy to demonstrate. So the sys-
tem is sound, since every proof begins with a sequent of the form σ ⊢ σ, like (20.1). 
                                                      
8 If a term in a formula φ is targeted by an arrow from outside φ, φ cannot be removed by assumption-
discharge with the rules ∨E and ∃E, while in a use of →I to infer Γ ⊢ p → q from Γ, p ⊢ q any arrow 
from a so in q to a constant in p must contract to maintain its target as p moves across ⊢. We also re-
quire that →E and &E cannot be applied if the antecedent or eliminated conjunct is linked to by the 
consequent or retained conjunct, and that in ~E, neither major nor minor premise contains so (we 
can often use so-E and so-I to work round these restrictions). Multi-premise rules require a notion of 
identity of formula; e.g., to apply →E to Σ ⊢ p → q we need the very same p in Γ ⊢ p on another line. 
To reason with formulae containing so, we must extend our notion of same formula to include the 
condition that corresponding so’s target tokens of the same type. 
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4.  Argument anaphora 
In our other example of a misuse of =E, 
(3) The man behind Fred saw him leave; the man behind Fred = the man in front 
of Bill; therefore, the man in front of Bill saw him leave, 
the anaphoric pronoun him in the minor premise or conclusion of (3) is assigned con-
tent by inheritance from an argument expression functioning as its antecedent. Stand-
ardly, indices are used to capture this: 
(21) The man behind Fred1 saw him1 leave; the man behind Fred = the man in 
front of Bill; therefore, the man in front of Bill2 saw him2 leave. 
The subscripts reflect how the English is understood: once the substitution is made, 
the last him inherits its reference from Bill. 
 A pronoun may be referentially dependent upon a proper name or a definite de-
scription (these are the terms), so it is time to stop being coy about the treatment of 
definite descriptions. For the purposes of this paper, we employ a Fregean account 
which takes them to be singular terms which give rise to presupposition-failures if 
they are improper. Let us say that a presupposition-failure generates a truth-value gap 
in atomic formulae and that φ is undefined iff φ has an undefined atomic subformula.9 
We stipulate 
(22) ⟦the v:φ⟧A,µ,h = the unique a ∈ DA such that (A, µ) ⊨ h^(v ⇒ a) φ if there is such 
an a; ⟦the v:φ⟧A,µ,h is undefined otherwise.10 
If a sentence contains indexed terms and pronouns with the same indices, we restrict 
evaluation to functions h defined for those indices which assign them the same do-
main elements as the terms to which they are attached, and we don’t allow pronouns 
with unanchored indices. So we are guaranteed, for any indexed pronoun ρi, that ⟦ρi⟧A,µ,h = h(i). 
 Co-indexing does not block substitution of a term t with a coreferential t$, since the 
content of the pronoun is the content of the term, not, as in the previous case, the term 
itself. So if Fred = Jed, then the man behind Jed1 saw him1 leave (the index attaches to 
the position). The problem cases, as (21) illustrates, arise when terms are embedded in 
complex terms. The same goes for applying ∃I (the only quantifier rule in whose rule-
scheme the term t may be a definite description): we cannot quantify away the entire 
description in the man behind Fred saw him leave, since this produces 
(23) (some x: person(x))[x saw him1 leave]. 
Him’s antecedent Fred has simply disappeared. Like (17), then, (23) should be unde-
fined. 
 We can make inferences with the likes of the man behind Fred1 saw him1 leave. This en-
tails that the man behind Fred saw someone leave, and given that the man behind 
Fred is the man in front of Bill, that the man in front of Bill saw Fred leave. We as-
                                                      
9 This is controversial. See (Soames 1989, 560) for discussion. 
10 The context µ plays no role in (21), but will have a role when we mix pronouns and so. 
Graeme FORBES 
Theoria 78 (2013): 359-374 
368 
sume a rule of depronominalization, (D), which stipulates that pronouns anaphoric on 
some term may be replaced by that term; and that the rule of Alphabetic Variant be 
extended to apply to indices as well as variables. We then require of =E and ∃I that 
they not apply to any term that properly contains anaphoric pronouns. We can illus-
trate how this works with an example that combines both the devices we have consid-
ered so far, the demonstrative so and pronouns: Giorgione1 knows he1 is so-called because of 
his1 size, therefore Giorgione1 is so-called because of his1 size.11 Deriving this requires a mean-
ing-postulate (FK) embodying the factivity of knows, which allows us to arrive at the 
conclusion in four steps:12 
(24.1) KGiorgione1(F(he1, so, his1 size))               Premise 
 
(24.2) KGiorgione1(F(he1, ‘Giorgione’, his1 size))              1, so-E 
(24.3) KGiorgione(F(Giorgione1, ‘Giorgione’, his1 size))            2, D 
(24.4) F(Giorgione1, ‘Giorgione’, his1 size)                 3, FK 
(24.5) F(Giorgione1, so, his1 size)                  4, so-I 
 
Speakers can carry anaphoric reference some distance into unambiguous discourses, 
but at any point, perhaps prompted by stylistic or processing constraints, a pronoun 
can be replaced by a name it depends on, and subsequent coindexed pronouns come 
to depend on the new occurrence of the name, the original occurrence losing its index. 
This is how we prepare in (24.3) for the detachment in (24.4). Separate constraints 
(like those in note 8) prevent detachment rules from leaving us with free indices. 
 Where does this leave Marcus’s idea, embodied in (8), that =E (and presumably ∃I) 
are correct rules so long as they are applied only to logical forms? (8) is in the service 
of conventional formulations of =E and ∃I and requires that amenable logical forms 
be imposed on sentences of the problematic types. What we have shown here is that 
when the language of such sentences is provided with a plausible system of inference, 
we can derive unproblematic sentences from the problematic ones by such rules as so-
                                                      
11 Predelli (2010) distinguishes between regular and ‘obstinate’ demonstratives, and regards the so of Gior-
gione is so-called because of his size as obstinate: there is no alternative to treating it as referring to ‘Gior-
gione’. Similarly, in (i) Guercino said that Giorgione was so-called because of his size, ‘Guercino’ is “unreacha-
ble” by so, ‘presumably due to syntactic constraints of this or that kind’ (Predelli 2010, 7). But I am 
unpersuaded that there is a special ‘obstinate’ use of so. The premise of our argument, Giorgione1 knows 
he1 is so-called because of his1 size, shows that so can easily reach outside its clause. The reason that it does 
not do so in (i) is that the speaker is reporting a speech-act of Guercino’s in which so-called is used to 
specify part of the content of what Guercino said. But we naturally assume a context in which Guer-
cino is not used to specify the speech-act content, while Giorgione is. This makes it seem that ‘Guer-
cino’ is unreachable by so. However, if Guercino is discussing people who are nicknamed Guercino be-
cause they squint, then an informed audience can read the report Guercino said that Giorgione was so-
nicknamed because of his squint in the way Predelli suggests grammar rules out. 
12 Each line in this proof begins with a suppressed ‘KG(F(he1, so, his1 size)) ⊢’ with a link from so back to 
Giorgione. 
Marcus and Substitutivity 
Theoria 78 (2013): 359-374 
369 
E and depronominalization and apply =E and ∃I in the conventional way to the de-
rived sentences. We then need only add restrictions to the standard versions of these 
rules to prevent attempted application of them before the admissible premises for 
their application are obtained. But such restrictions fall under a general type of re-
striction that is always implicit in natural deduction, that application of a rule should 
have no truth-condition-altering side-effect. 
5.  Attitude ascriptions 
In the two cases we have considered, that of so and of pronouns, the failure of =E to 
preserve truth and of ∃I to preserve interpretability have gone hand in hand. An ex-
ample of substitution failure in which the substituted terms are purely referential, the 
device explaining substitution-failure is essentially the same as one of the two above, 
and yet quantifier introduction is not blocked, would break the connection. We end by 
considering a case which appears to satisfy this description but will argue that properly 
understood, the appearance is mere appearance. This is a happy outcome for Quine’s 
view that quantification into substituting-resisting position is incoherent. 
 What rule of =E is appropriate for languages in which attitude ascriptions can be 
expressed? If we are in agreement that  
(5) Lex fears Superman; Superman = Clark; therefore Lex fears Clark 
has a reading on which it is a fallacy, then we have the option of saying that the posi-
tion of Superman in the minor premise on such a reading is not purely referential. But 
Marcus would be among the last to assent to this proposal, and besides, we have seen 
no motivation for it in our previous cases, where the problem arose from =E’s affect-
ing the semantic value of some other, dependent, term, so or a pronoun, and wasn’t re-
lated to the semantics of the substituted term. Such a proposal would, moreover, 
make the preservation of interpretability in 
(6) Lex fears Superman; therefore, someone is such that Lex fears him 
puzzling, since it is not obvious how a device of pure reference, such as a variable, 
could function in a position that is not purely referential—Quine’s point. 
 Despite her interest in the Giorgione case, Marcus does not seem to have considered 
the possibility that substitution-failure in attitude ascriptions is to be accounted for by 
the covert presence of something analogous to so-called. Perhaps such a proposal 
seemed to her to threaten (6), but we shall see that this need not be so. The idea 
would be that (5) fails for essentially the same reason that (1) fails: replacing Superman 
has the side-effect of changing another expression’s content. This in turn would be 
because the minor premise of (5), (25.1) below, is underlyingly (25.2) for the reading 
on which (5) is invalid: 
(25.1) Lex fears Superman 
(25.2) Lex fears Superman as such. 
In logical form the sentential adverb phrase as such is prefixed as a complex sentential 
operator, consisting in the preposition as and the demonstrative such. The claim is that 
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(25.1) optionally contains a phonetically null operator O with a semantics like as such; 
when the operator is present, =E fails. For (25.2) we would write more formally  
(26) as such(fears(Lex, Superman)) 
which expresses a proposition relative to a Kaplan-style context that fixes a reference 
for the such. We display contexts in the arrow notation, so that the intended meaning 
for (26) is given by 
(27) as such(fears(Lex, Superman)) 
 
(27) exhibits the context µ such that µ(1) = <1, Superman>. In this context, (26) ex-
presses the same proposition as the context-independent Lex fears Superman as Super-
man. 
 The main idea behind the semantics is that intensional transitives like fear are as-
signed a set of alternative extensions instead of a single extension. As is assigned a 
function which looks at the content of such in a given context µ and produces another 
function, one which selects an extension from the available alternatives for each inten-
sional transitive in the scope of the as such in question. Which extension-selector is 
produced by as can vary with the content of such. So whether or not (26) comes out 
true in a context µ will depend on the action of the extension-selector produced by as 
on fear. When Superman is the content of such, we get an extension-selector that picks 
an extension for fear containing <Lex, the Man of Steel>. When Clark is the content 
of such, we get an extension-selector that picks an extension for fear not containing 
<Lex, the Man of Steel>.13 
 On the proof-theoretic side, we require the LF-restriction on the rule of =E, that 
targeted constants cannot be substituted. There is also an Elimination rule for as such, 
namely, that from as such(i)(φ) we can infer φ. The semantic justification for this is that 
if as such(i)(φ) holds, this means that each relevant pair of objects belongs to at least one 
of the extensions in the semantic value of each intensional verb ψ in φ. Then if φ is 
evaluated independently, it will come out true, so long as we arrange for the absence 
of as such to trigger a union operation on ⟦ψ⟧ resulting in a single extension that con-
tains each pair of objects in at least one extension in ⟦ψ⟧. 
 The soundness of as such-Elimination is important for solving the puzzle of why 
quantifier introduction, as illustrated in  
(6) Lex fears Superman; therefore, someone is such that Lex fears him 
produces an interpretable conclusion. Assuming that only individual constants can be 
targeted, the derivation of a truth-condition for a sentence containing a such that tar-
gets a variable will crash. But it follows that the conclusion of (6) is uninterpretable 
only if we suppose it to have been inferred by essentially one step of ∃I. The reason 
(6) strikes us as acceptable is that when we interpret Lex fears Superman as (26), Lex 
                                                      
13 For technical details in the framework of neo-Davidsonian event-semantics, see further (Forbes 2000, 
154–64); at p.156 I thank David Kaplan for pointing out an extensionality problem for the multi-
extension ‘atomic’ semantics I am now describing, which I resolved in that paper by quantifying over 
events. But it would be too tangential to Marcus’s work to pursue this here. 
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fears Superman as such, we take (6) to be an enthymeme in which a step of as such Elimi-
nation is implicitly performed before ∃I is applied.  
 This means that the case of attitude ascriptions is not really different from the oth-
ers we have investigated: the mechanism explaining substitution-resistance also blocks 
quantifier introduction, if it is present. The superficial difference is that in ordinary 
English, the mechanism’s presence or absence is not indicated on the surface, whereas 
the difference between, say, Giorgione is so-called and Giorgione is called ‘Giorgione’, is easy 
to see. 
 Objectual attitude ascriptions are the easier case. Ideally, we would like an abso-
lutely uniform treatment of objectual and propositional ascriptions; but it is unclear 
how this is to be accomplished. One reasonable philosophical account of the phe-
nomenon of substitution-resistance in objectual attitude ascriptions is that we can 
stand in attitude relations to objects under modes of presentation of those objects. Fur-
thermore, we may stand in such a relation to a certain object under one mode but not 
under another. The differing extensions for an intensional transitive like fear show 
which experiencer-theme pairs enter or drop out of the verb’s extension as modes of 
presentation vary. We may say that objectual attitude relations are relations to Russelli-
an entities that hold under Fregean ones. Names are modally but not cognitively equiv-
alent because only cognitive operators like as such invoke the Fregean entities. 
 A uniform account of propositional and objectual ascriptions would require that 
propositional attitude relations are also relations to Russellian entities that hold under 
Fregean ones. But here we run into difficulties, since it seems that the only candidate 
for the second term of a propositional relation is a proposition. Fregeans and Russelli-
ans characteristically disagree over the nature of propositions (there is no comparable 
disagreement about the objects in objectual ascriptions). So it is unclear how a theory 
of propositional ascriptions could combine Frege and Russell. 
 In her later work, Marcus (1990b, 240-1) made the interesting proposal that Rus-
sellians abandon the notion of proposition, which she argues is ineliminably ‘language-
centered’, and exchange it for the ‘object-centered’ notion of a state of affairs (SOA). So-
called “propositional” attitude relations are really relations to states of affairs, which 
are complexes of objects and properties. The idea that modal properties are fundamen-
tally features of SOA’s is one to which I am highly sympathetic (see Forbes 1989, 
ch. 5), but Marcus’s suggestion is more radical. And she argues that substituting SOA’s 
for propositions helps Russellians with issues about the rationality of those who ap-
parently take “assentive” attitudes towards contradictory Russellian propositions 
(1990b, 248-51), as in the example 
(28) Lex fears that Superman is nearby and Clark is not.14 
The advantages for Russellians of replacing a fear with a contradictory proposition as 
its content with fearing an impossible SOA are not so clear to me.15 But once we have 
                                                      
14 Suppose Lex {hopes/plans} to use Clark as a hostage to thwart Superman. 
15 Marcus says (loc. cit.) that the language-centred theorist is “baffled” by the question, does Lex fear Clark 
is nearby or does he not? She then argues that if we take the object-centred view that a belief is a dis-
positional relation to a SOA, namely, to act as if that SOA a obtained, “a puzzle has been solved”. But I 
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distinguished SOA’s and propositions in Marcus’s way, we can think of propositions as 
modes of presentation of SOA’s. We are then in a position to distinguish believing an im-
possible SOA from believing a manifestly impossible SOA, a distinction reflected in the 
following two formulations: 
(29.1) as such(fears(Lex, that Superman is nearby and Clark is not)) 
 
(29.2) as such(fears(Lex, that Superman is nearby and Superman is not)). 
 
Here the that-clauses refer to SOA’s, and the indicated subsentences invoke modes of 
presentation of them. We should therefore extend our semantics to propositional atti-
tude verbs and accommodate the introduction of SOA’s: an extension for fear may in-
clude experiencer-SOA pairs as well as experiencer-object pairs, fear is assigned multi-
ple extensions, and as such chooses between them as before. Substitution is again for-
bidden for targeted expressions; we simply expand the range of expressions that can 
be targeted. More carefully, substitution of expressions that are either targeted them-
selves, or that contain a targeted proper constituent, is forbidden. So there is no inter-
changing that Superman is nearby and Clark is not and that Superman is nearby and Superman 
is not even though they both refer to the same SOA. Similarly, there is no quantifying 
into any position within the extent of the delimiter of a targeted expression.  
 The treatments of objectual and propositional ascriptions are now exactly parallel. 
But have we paid a high price for this uniformity? There is a difficulty in the area of 
action-explanation. We will accept that 
(30) Anyone who fears Superman and believes Superman is nearby will, ceteris pari-
bus, try to avoid encountering Superman on the occasion of acquiring the be-
lief.16 
This is a correct principle if fears, believes and try are in the scope of (the unvoiced coun-
terpart O of) as such. But (30) seems to be an instance of the more general  
(31) Anyone who fears a certain person and believes that that person is nearby 
will, ceteris paribus, try to avoid encountering that person on the occasion of 
acquiring the belief. 
However, (31) contains only variables, and variables cannot be targeted, so there is no 
as such in (31) if (31) expresses a complete proposition. But in that case, a step of ∀E 
on (31),17 followed by =E, will produce the apparently false 
                                                                                                                                         
find myself baffled by the question what it would be to act as if the SOA Clark is nearby and Clark is not 
nearby obtains, assuming univocal Clark. 
16 Strictly, we ought to say something more cautious along the lines of try to do something that he or she thinks 
within his or her powers and thinks will significantly reduce the chances of encountering that person on that occasion, if 
he or she believes the chances of an encounter are too high without such steps being taken. 
17 It’s not really ∀E that is applied to (31) unless we are thinking of a regimentation in which the unbound 
anaphora in (31) is removed by replacing someone with a wide-scope universal. But we can certainly ins-
tantiate (31) and then use =E to infer (32) below, however exactly the instantiation is to be explained. 
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(32) Anyone who fears Superman and believes Clark is nearby will, ceteris paribus, 
try to avoid encountering Superman on the occasion of acquiring the belief. 
How should we deal with this difficulty? The problem is that (31) apparently instanti-
ates two referentially transparent ascriptions, that is, in our framework, ones without oc-
currences of as such to block substitutions such as the substitution of Clark that results 
in (32). The substitution carries us from an apparently predictive principle to one that 
isn’t. Of course, logic only promises to preserve truth, not explanatoriness or predic-
tiveness. Nevertheless, it is puzzling that (31) seems apt for deploying in explanation 
of a subject’s furtive behavior, yet its instances fail us.  
 How the subject thinks of the object or SOA is relevant to explanatoriness, and I 
see only two ways consonant with my approach of accounting for principles like 
(31).18 One proposal is that when we understand (31) to be true, we are implicitly in-
serting quantifiers over modes of presentation: if you fear someone under a certain 
m.p. and believe under that m.p. that that person is nearby, then… Of course, this in-
terpretation allows us to instantiate the objectual variable with a name and the m.p. 
variable with a name of a coreferential name, so that we get the likes of (27) only as a 
special case.  
 Alternatively, it may be that principles like (31) are not understood as exception-
less: there is a suppressed “typically”, and the, or one, atypical case is precisely when 
the subject has two different ways of thinking of the same individual. For subjects 
who have only one way of thinking of the object in question, the generalizations are 
correct. But for subjects with more than one way of thinking of the object, instantia-
tion has to be followed by as such Introduction in the scope of intensional verbs. The 
introduced occurrences of as such then follow the anaphoric dependencies for their in-
terpretation. From (31) this process would produce, informally, 
(33) Anyone who fears Superman1 as such and believes that person1, as such, 
 
  is nearby will, c.p., try to avoid encountering that person1 as such 
and there is no route from here to the unwanted (32). (33) is also correct in the typical 
case, but is overkill if we are assuming that the subject only has one way of thinking of 
the Man of Steel.19  
 Clearly, then, the problem of how commonsense psychological explanation works 
is of very great relevance to the semantic issues we have been discussing here. Explor-
ing their interrelationships would surely be an appropriate way of extending Marcus’s 
legacy. 
                                                      
18 A very different approach, based on making liberal use of ceteris paribus qualifiers, is developed in (Braun 
2000). 
19 A principle that lacks intensional operators in its consequent may appear to be explanatory of brute 
behavior, e.g., ‘anyone who dislikes Superman and thinks he can get away with it will hit him’. 
Nothing I have said blocks substitution of ‘Clark’ for ‘him’, since the latter is not within the scope of 
an intensional verb. But I am inclined to think that if the quoted principle is correct, so is ‘anyone 
who dislikes Superman and thinks he can get away with it will hit Clark’, certainly so if we prefix ‘sin-
ce Superman is Clark’. 
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